script disarming and large javascript messages

[Steve Freegard]

Greg Matthews wrote:
> Is anyone else seeing a problem with disarming scripts within email 
> resulting in messages containing ~200k of disarmed javascript? This 
> looks like complete nonsense to the recipient.

Why are you getting e-mail with Javascript in it in the first place? I 
can't think any e-mail clients that will run any javascript due to the 
security issues of doing so.

> The script contains lots of references to Dana<foo>, here is a typical 
> first chunk:
> 
> var DanaShimData="var DSJsFuncs = 
> [null,null,[{nm:\"go\",flg:0xf},{nm:\"dJ\",flg:0x37},],null,[{nm:\"item\",flg:0xf},{nm:\"href\",flg:0xf},{nm:\"save\",lcnm:\"save\",flg:0xb},{nm:\"open\",lcnm:\"open\",flg:0x3b},{nm:\"load\",lcnm:\"load\",flg:0x3b},{nm:\"eval\",flg:0x57},],....... 
> 
> 
> Note that the lines are very long, sometimes over 5000 characters!

1000 characters including the CRLF is the maximum line length allowed by 
the RFC.  Is this the case pre-disarming?

> Is there any alternative to simply turning off script disarming? Seems 
> drastic and possibly dangerous.

I'd definitely be finding out what this stuff is doing in an e-mail in 
the first place.

Cheers,
Steve.